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We address the problem of how the survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the motion of
the individuals. Specifically, we study a model in which Prisoner’s Dilemma players are allowed to move in a
two-dimensional plane. Our results show that cooperation can survive in such a system provided that both the
temptation to defect and the velocity at which agents move are not too high. Moreover, we show that when
these conditions are fulfilled, the only asymptotic state of the system is that in which all players are cooperators.
Our results might have implications for the design of cooperative strategies in motion coordination and other
applications including wireless networks.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ga,89.75.Fb,89.75.Hc
An open question in biology and social sciences is to un-
derstand how cooperation emerges in a population of selfish
individuals. A theoretical framework that has shed some light
into this long-standing problem is evolutionary game theory
[1, 2]. Through the development and the study of different
social dilemmas, scientists have been able to elucidate some
of the mechanisms that enable cooperative behavior in pop-
ulations. In particular, one of the most studied games is the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a two-players game in which each
individual can only adopt one of the two available strategies:
cooperation (C) or defection (D). While a population of in-
dividuals playing a PD game does not support cooperation if
they are well-mixed, the existence of a spatial structure gives
as a result that cooperation survives under certain conditions
as cooperative clusters can emerge in the system [1, 2].
In the last years, the field has been spurred by new discov-
eries on the actual structure of the systems to which evolution-
ary models are applied. It turns out that in the vast majority
of real-world networks of interactions [3], the probability that
an individual has k contacts follows a power-law distribution
P (k) ∼ k−γ , being γ an exponent that usually lies between 2
and 3. Examples of these so-called scale-free (SF) networks
can be found in almost every field of science [3]. An alterna-
tive to a power-law distribution is a network of contacts that
approaches an exponential tail for k larger than the average
connectivity in the population, being the Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER)
network the benchmark of this kind of distribution [3].
Recent works have shown that cooperative behavior is ac-
tually enhanced when individuals play on complex networks,
particularly if the network of contacts is scale-free [4, 5, 6, 7].
The reason is that cooperators are fixed in the highly con-
nected nodes, turning also into cooperators their neighbor-
hood and guaranteeing in this way their long-time success.
Additionally, several works have explored different rewiring
mechanisms that allow an improvement in the average level of
cooperation in the system [8, 9, 10, 11]. In contrast, coopera-
tion can also be promoted without invoking different rewiring
rules [12, 13]. Interestingly, social dilemmas can also be used
to generate highly cooperative networks by implementing a
growth mechanism in which the newcomers are attracted to
already existing nodes with a probability that depends on the
nodes’ benefits [14].
In spite of the relative large body of work that has been
accumulated in the last few years, there are situations of prac-
tical relevance that remain less explored. This is the case of
models where individuals can move and change their neigh-
borhood continuously by encountering different game’s part-
ners as time goes on. Highly changing environments can be
found in a number of social situations and the study of how
cooperative levels are affected by the inherent mobility of
the system’s constituents can shed light on the general ques-
tion of how cooperation emerges. Furthermore, the insight
gained can be used to design cooperation-based protocols for
communication between wireless devices such as robots [15].
Recently, a few works have dealt with this kind of situation
[16, 17, 18, 19]. However, the models were limited to the case
in which individuals are allowed to move on the sites of a 2D
regular lattice. In this paper, we consider the less-constrained
case in which a set of Prisoner’s Dilemma players uncondi-
tionally move on a two dimensional plane. We explore under
which conditions cooperation is sustained. In particular, we
inspect the robustness of the average level of cooperation in
the population under variation of the game parameters and of
the mobility rules. Our results show that cooperation is actu-
ally promoted provided that players do not move too fast and
that cooperation is not too expensive. Additionally, at vari-
ance with other cases, the dynamics of the system exhibits
only two stable attractors -those in which the whole popula-
tion plays with one of the two possible strategies.
In our model, we consider N agents (individuals) moving
2in a square plane of size L with periodic boundary conditions,
and playing a game on the instantaneous network of contacts.
The three main ingredients of the model are: the rules of the
motion, the definition of the graph of interactions, and the
rules of the evolutionary game.
Motion. Each agent moves at time t with a ve-
locity vi(t) (i = 1, 2, . . . , N). We assume that individ-
uals can only change their direction of motion, θi(t), but
not their speed which is constant in time, and equal for all
the agents. Hence we can write the velocities as: vi(t) =
(v cos θi(t), v sin θi(t)). The individuals are initially assigned
a random position in the square and a random direction of mo-
tion. At each time step they update their positions and velocity
according to the following dynamical rules:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + vi(t) (1)
θi(t+ 1) = ηi (2)
where xi(t) is the position of the i-th agent in the plane at
time t and ηi are N independent random variables chosen at
each time with uniform probability in the interval [−pi;pi].
Network of interactions. At each time step we consider
that the neighborhood of a given agent i is made up by all the
individuals j which are within an Euclidean distance dij less
than some threshold r. In what follows, without loss of gener-
ality, we set r = 1. Therefore, the instant network of contacts
is defined as the graph formed by nodes centered at all the N
circles of radius 1 together with the links between those agents
in the neighborhood of each individual. Note that as agents
move every time step, the network of contacts, and hence the
adjacency matrix of the graph is continuously changing, not
only because the number of contacts an individual has may
change, but also due to the fact that the neighbors are not al-
ways the same. The topological features of the graph defined
above depend on several parameters. For instance, the mean
degree of the graph can be written as 〈k〉 = ρpir2 = ρpi where
ρ = N/L2 is the density of agents. For small values of ρ,
the graph is composed by several components and there may
also exist isolated individuals. On the contrary, when ρ > ρc
a unique giant component appears [20] (for our system with
periodic boundary conditions ρc ∼ 1.43).
Evolutionary dynamics. As the rules governing the evo-
lutionary dynamics, we assume that individuals interact by
playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Initially, players
adopt one of the two available strategies, namely to cooperate
or to defect, with the same probability 1/2. At every round
of the game all the agents play once with all their correspond-
ing instant neighbors. The results of a game translate into the
following payoffs: both agents receive R under mutual co-
operation and P under mutual defection, while a cooperator
receives S when confronted to a defector, which in turn re-
ceives T . These four payoffs are ordered as T > R > P ≥ S
in the PD game so that defection is the best choice, regard-
less of the opponent strategy. As usual in recent studies, we
choose the PD payoffs as R = 1, P = S = 0, and T = b > 1.
Once the agents have played with all their neighbors, they ac-
cumulate the payoffs obtained in each game, and depending
on their total payoffs and on the payoffs of the first neighbors,
they decide whether or not to keep playing with the same strat-
egy for the next round robin. In this process, an agent i picks
up at random one of its neighbors, say j, and compare their
respective payoffs Pi and Pj . If Pi > Pj , nothing happens
and i keeps playing with the same strategy. On the contrary,
if Pj > Pi , agent i adopts the strategy of j with a probability
proportional to the payoff difference:
Πij =
Pj − Pi
max{kj, ki}b
, (3)
where ki and kj are the number of instant neighbors of i and
j respectively (i.e. the number of agents inside the circles
of radius r centered at i and j respectively). This process of
strategy updating is done synchronously for all the agents of
the system and is a finite population analogue of replicator
dynamics. When finished, the payoffs are reset to zero, so
that repeated games are not considered.
The movement and game dynamics might in general be cor-
related, and the influence of the agents movement on the per-
formance of the PD dynamics depends on the ratio between
their corresponding time scales. Here, we consider the situa-
tion in which both movement and evolutionary dynamics have
the same time scale. Therefore, at each time step, the fol-
lowing sequence is performed: (i) the agents perform a new
movement in the two-dimensional space, (ii) establish the new
network of contacts (determined by the radius r of interaction)
and (iii) they play a round of the PD game, accumulating the
payoffs and finally updating their corresponding strategies ac-
cordingly. After this latter step, the players move again. The
process is repeated until a stationary state is reached. Here, a
stationary state is one in which no further changes of strategies
are possible.
We have performed extensive numerical simulations of the
model for various values of the agent density ρ and velocity v,
and different values of the game parameter b. Let us first note
that for the limiting case in which v = 0, the results point out
that the average level of cooperation is different from zero, as
one might expect from the fact that the underlying network of
contacts has a Poisson degree distribution. Indeed, the graph
corresponds to a random geometric graph [20], a network hav-
ing the same P (k) as an ER random graph, but with a higher
clustering coefficient. This latter feature leads to a further in-
crement of the average level of cooperation, as it has been
shown that a network with a high clustering coefficient pro-
motes cooperation [21, 22].
Let us now focus on the case v 6= 0. The first difference
that arises with respect to the case in which agents do not
move is that the dynamics of the system only have two attrac-
tors. Namely, the asymptotic state (i.e., when the probability
that any player changes its strategy is zero) is either a fully
cooperative network (all-C) or a network in which all the in-
dividuals end up playing as defectors (all-D). This behavior is
illustrated in Fig. 1, where we have reported the average level
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FIG. 1: Average level of cooperation, 〈c〉, as a function of time
(Monte Carlo steps) for v = 0.01 and two different values of b,
b = 1.1 b = 1.3, as indicated. Other model parameters have been
fixed to ρ = 1.30 and N = 103 agents.
FIG. 2: Fraction of realizations in which the system ends up in an
all-C configuration, Fc, as a function of the density of players ρ for
a fixed value of b = 1.1 and v = 0.01. The system is made up of
N = 103 agents. The results are averages taken over 100 different
realizations.
of cooperation 〈c〉 in a population of N = 103 individuals as a
function of time, for v = 0.01 and for two different values of
b. Starting from a configuration in which individuals are co-
operators or defectors with the same probability, the average
level of cooperation slowly evolves to one of the two asymp-
totic states: all-C or all-D. It is also worth stressing that the
system reaches those states more slowly than in static settings
(i.e., when v = 0). Specifically, it appears that the system
spends a considerable time in metastable states (flat regions in
the figure) that are followed by a sudden decrease (or increase)
of the average level of cooperation.
The evolution of the system depends on the density of play-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The color code shows the fraction of realiza-
tions in which the whole system is made up of cooperators, Fc, as a
function of the velocity at which the agents move (v) and the temp-
tation to defect (b). The Y-axis is in log scale for clarity. The rest
of parameters are N = 103 agents and ρ = 1.30. Each point is an
average over 100 different realizations
ers. In Fig. 2, we have represented the dependence of the frac-
tion of realizations, Fc in which the population ends up in an
all-C configuration as a function of the density ρ for b = 1.1
and v = 0.01. There are two limits for which Fc = 0. At
low values of the density, the agents are too spread in the 2D
plane. As a result, cooperators unsuccessfully strive to sur-
vive and get extinguished given the low chance they have to
form clusters -the only mechanism that can enforce their suc-
cess. On the contrary, for large values of ρ the population is
quite dense and, locally, the agents’ neighborhoods resemble
a well-mixed population in which more or less everybody in-
teracts with everybody and therefore defection is the only pos-
sible asymptotic state. Values of ρ between these two limiting
cases confer to cooperators a chance to survive. Interestingly,
there is a region of the density of players, 0.9 . ρ . 3 which
is optimal for cooperative behavior. Beyond this region Fc
decays exponentially with ρ reaching zero at ρ ≈ 7.
Up to now, we have analyzed the behavior of the system for
small values of the velocity of the agents and of the tempta-
tion to defect. Figure 3 summarizes the results obtained for a
wider range of model parameters (v and b) in a population of
N = 103 agents and ρ = 1.3. The results are averages taken
over 100 realizations of the model. The phase diagram shows
a relative wide region of the model parameters in which coop-
erative behavior survives. For a fixed value of v, this region
is bounded by a maximum value of the temptation to defect
close to b = 1.3, which decreases as the velocity at which
players move increases. Furthermore, when b is kept fixed, in-
creasing the value of v is not always beneficial for the survival
of cooperation. In fact, when the individuals move too fast,
they change their environment quite often and quickly, then
increasing the likelihood to meet each time step a completely
different set of players. In other words, when the velocity is
increased beyond a certain value, the well-mixed hypothesis
4FIG. 4: Fraction of realizations ending up in an all-C configuration
as a function of the velocity v of the agents for b = 1.1. The inset
shows the smallest value of the temptation to defect, bc, for which the
probability of achieving a fully cooperator asymptotic state is zero,
as a function of v. In both cases, N = 103 agents, ρ = 1.30, and
results correspond to averages over 100 realizations.
applies to the whole population of players, thus leading to the
extinction of cooperation in the long time limit.
Figure 4 sheds more light on the dependence of the fraction
of cooperators with respect to the velocity of the agents. There
we have represented the layer corresponding to b = 1.1 in Fig.
3. As can be seen from the figure, for low values of v all the
realizations lead the system to a configuration in which all
strategists are cooperators. As the PD players move faster, the
probability of achieving such a configuration decreases and
gets zero for values of v close to 0.05. From that point on,
the all-C asymptotic state is never realized. This latter point
also depends on the specific value of b. The inset of Fig. 4,
represents the smallest values of the temptation to defect, bc,
for which in all the realizations performed the system ended
up in the all defectors state as a function of v. The results
show that beyond v ≈ 0.1, cooperation never survives in a
population of moving agents irrespective of b.
In short, we have studied the effects of mobility on a pop-
ulation of Prisoner’s Dilemma players that are able to move
in a two-dimensional plane. Numerical simulations of the
model show that a fully cooperative system is sustained when
both the temptation to defect and the velocity of the agents
are not too high. Although cooperation is extinguished for
a wide region of the parameter space, our results show that
mobility have a positive effect on the emergence of cooper-
ation. As a matter of fact, as soon as v 6= 0, the mobility
of the agents provokes the spread of the winning strategy to
the whole population, leading the system to a global attrac-
tor in which all players share the surviving strategy. In other
words, the movement of individuals prevents the coexistence
of different strategies in the long time limit. Namely, for small
(and fixed) values of b cooperation prevails at low velocities,
while defection succeeds for larger v. Our results are rele-
vant for the design of new cooperation-based protocols aimed
at motion coordination among wireless devices and for other
communication processes based on game theoretical models
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